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A DISTANT MIRROR:  THE SHEPPARD CASE FROM  
THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 
JAMES ROBERTSON1 
The title of these remarks is homage to the great popular historian Barbara 
Tuchman.  Her book entitled A Distant Mirror may not have been as successful as 
The Guns Of August, which won the Pulitzer Prize, but I think it is her most 
ambitious and fascinating work.  A Distant Mirror is about the 14th centurya 
tumultuous time when the world (meaning Europe) was rebuilding itself and its 
institutions after the Black Death killed one-third of the people living between India 
and Iceland.  Tuchman knew that by drawing analogies to our own time she could 
make us pay attention to the stories that history tells.  Her analogy, as she looked into 
a six hundred year-old mirror in 1978, was to a world trying to put itself together 
after a nuclear holocaust.  Today, when we are beginning to be able to imagine a 
world decimated or double-decimated by AIDS,2 her book seems even more 
relevant. 
The Sam Sheppard case is a mirror, tooa mirror with many facets.  Indeed, as I 
think we will discover in this conference, the mirror of the Sheppard case has much 
in common with the Mirror of Erised, where Harry Potter found his parents3: what 
we see depends on who we are and what we are looking for.  The criminal law 
faculty has convened a diverse and distinguished group of journalists, lawyers, and 
academics.  When they look into the fifty year-old mirror of Cleveland’s famous 
Sheppard case, they see many different questions and problems.  How does, or how 
should, the media deal with the high profile criminal trial today?  What 
responsibility, if any, rests upon those who report and comment in the media?  What 
is, and what will be, the role of forensic science?   
My own vantage point is that of a trial judge, and for me, revisiting the Sheppard 
case is a chance to ruminate on the relationship between judges and the media and 
how judges deal with high profile cases.  I will consider that subject this evening, 
and then meander a little farther along and share a few thoughts about what I call 
hermetically sealed justice—our modern insistence that judges say nothing and juries 
know nothing.  Finally, if I have time, I will have a few words to say about DNA 
evidence and the “reliable verdict” ideal that appears to be one of the propositions to 
which this conference is dedicated.   
The Sam Sheppard case produced three verdicts.  The first one was unreliable 
because the United States Supreme Court said so.  The second one was reliable for 
its obedience to the  presumption of innocence.  The third one was inevitable because 
it is harder to prove innocence than to presume it.   
Because I am the first speaker, and because some of you may be a bit fuzzy about 
the Sheppard case or confused about what I just said, let me review some of the basic 
facts. 
                                                                
1United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.  
2Or, since September 11, 2001, worse.  
3J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 207 (1998). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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THE SHEPPARD CASE 
Marilyn Sheppard was bludgeoned to death in the upstairs bedroom of her 
lakefront home in Bay Village in the early morning hours of July 4, 1954.  Her son 
Chip, who is now Samuel Reece Sheppard and will address us tomorrow morning, 
was asleep in an adjoining bedroom.  Her husband Samuel, a young osteopath from a 
prominent family, told the police that he had fallen asleep on the couch downstairs; 
that he heard his wife cry out; that he ran upstairs and saw a “form” standing next to 
his wife’s bed; that he struggled with the form but was struck unconscious; that he 
regained his senses, looked at his wife, took her pulse, and thought she was dead; 
that he then heard a noise, ran downstairs, chased the form to the shore of the lake, 
struggled again, and lost consciousness again; that he awoke lying half in the water, 
returned home, checked his wife’s pulse again, and called his neighbor, who was the 
mayor of Bay Village. 
The Sheppard murder would probably not make the front page today.  We have 
seen too many thousands of TV murders and too many hundreds of real ones, and we 
are jaded.  Give us a strangled six-year old beauty queen or a Hall of Fame running 
back contemplating suicide on a Los Angeles freeway and we might pay attention.  
But, in 1954, the world was young.  There was no freeway here; the Ohio Turnpike 
wasn’t even open.  Travel by jet plane was a novelty.  Cleveland, and most American 
cities the size of Cleveland, still had morning and afternoon daily newspapers, but 
they were locked in a struggle for survival with one another and with the new media 
kid on the block, television. If you believe, as I do, that Alan Freed invented rock ‘n’ 
roll on WJW, that art form was barely three years old.  Dwight Eisenhower was 
president.  Earl Warren had been Chief Justice for only a year.  Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka4, the school desegregation decision, was only a few weeks old.  
The Warren Court had not yet begun to coalesce around its great criminal law 
decisions of Mapp v. Ohio (exclusionary rule, 1961)5, Gideon v. Wainwright (right to 
counsel, 1963)6, Brady v. Maryland (disclosure of exculpatory evidence, 1963)7, and, 
of course, Miranda v. Arizona (1966)8.    
All of those decisions, but especially Miranda, might have been of considerable 
help to Dr. Sheppard.  He was interrogated by Cleveland police the day of the 
murder while he was under sedation in his hospital room.  He was interrogated again 
later the same day by the chief of police and two other officers who confronted him 
with evidence and demanded explanations.  He made himself available thereafter for 
frequent and extended questioning, but his willingness to talk (unimaginable today) 
did not keep the Cleveland Press and the Cleveland Plain Dealer from running page-
one stories reporting his lack of co-operation.  The Press was indignant that he 
refused to submit to a polygraph test, and it complained with all the subtlety of a 
meat axe that someone was “getting away with murder.”  On July 21, a coroner’s 
inquest was convened in a school gymnasium. It was broadcast live.  Sheppard, 
                                                                
4349 U.S. 294 (1954).  
5367 U.S. 643.  
6372 U.S. 335.  
7373 U.S. 83.  
8384 U.S. 436.  
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although not yet under arrest, was brought in by policemen who searched him in full 
view of several hundred spectators.  “Sheppard’s counsel were present during the 
three-day inquest but were not permitted to participate.  When Sheppard’s chief 
counsel attempted to place some documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected 
from the room by the coroner, who received cheers, hugs and kisses from ladies in 
the audience.  Sheppard was questioned for five and one half hours about his actions 
on the night of the murder, his married life, and a love affair with Susan Hayes.”9  
Believe it or not, things went downhill from there.  The Press and the Plain 
Dealer ran front page editorials demanding that Sheppard be arrested and charged.  
Within days, he was indeed arrested, bound over to the grand jury, and indicted.  The 
case was assigned to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Edward Blythin, who 
was running for re-election that year, and who set the trial to begin two weeks before 
election day.  The names and addresses of all seventy-five members of the jury 
venire were printed on the front page.  The judge virtually turned his courtroom over 
to the media, apparently in the sincere belief that freedom of the press was 
paramount and that he had no choice.   
I could go on and on about this.  The first seven or eight pages of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Sheppard v. Maxwell make extremely entertaining reading and 
could occupy all the time I have been given for these remarks.  But I need to hurry 
along with my precis of the case before sharing with you what I see in the mirror. 
Sam Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to prison 
for life.  His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County10 
and by the Ohio State Supreme Court.11 In 1956, the United States Supreme Court 
denied his application for a writ of certiorari.12  Eight years later, a young lawyer 
named F. Lee Bailey brought a federal habeas corpus petition before Chief Judge 
Carl A. Weinman in the Southern District of Ohio (where Dr. Sam was in prison).  
Judge Weinman granted the writ, principally because of Judge Blythin’s failure to 
grant a change of venue or a continuance in view of the newspaper publicity, and he 
ordered Sheppard released from prison.13  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 panel decision, reversed.14  Then, in its 1966 landmark 
decision,  the United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and ordered a 
new trial.  Bailey defended Dr. Sam in the second trial, and the jury found him not 
guilty.  More than twenty years later, long after his father’s death, Sam Reese 
Sheppard went public with his theory  that the “bushy haired man” who murdered his 
mother was really Richard George Eberling, a window washer who had worked in 
the Sheppard house in 1954 and whose own life had been surrounded by sudden and 
unexplained deaths. DNA tests indicated that blood found at the scene was neither 
Sam Sheppard’s nor Marilyn’s.  Sam Reece Sheppard sued for wrongful 
imprisonment, a suit he could not win without a jury verdict that Dr. Sam was 
innocent.  In 1998, a Cuyahoga County jury refused to return that verdict. 
                                                                
9Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1966).  
10State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955).  
11Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956).  
12Sheppard v. State of Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956). 
13Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio E.D. 1964). 
14Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (1965). 
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So, here is what I see in the mirror of this case. 
JUDGES AND THE MEDIA 
First, as to the relationship between judges and the press:  Let’s have a little 
sympathy for Judge Blythin—and for trial judges everywhere!  He was an old 
fashioned judge confronted by a situation not unprecedented, but very rare.  He 
thought that freedom of the press was absolute.  The Supreme Court’s criticism of 
his management of the trial twelve years after the fact was a classic exercise in 
appellate hindsight.  The Court knew about its own decisions in Marshall v. United 
States15 (jurors exposed through news accounts to information not admitted at trial)  
and Irvin v. Dowd16 (atmosphere disturbed by huge wave of public passion) and 
Estes v. State of Texas17 (procedure giving rise to probability of prejudice inherently 
lacking in due process), but Judge Blythin couldn’t have known about them: they 
had not been decided in 1954.  Justice Clark’s opinion offered helpful hints for 
judges who might face similar situations in the future: try limiting press access; 
insulating witnesses; issuing gag orders.  Those were great ideas, but they were 
unsupported by citations to cases that Judge Blythin could have read.   
Today, a trial judge dropped into the center of a press maelstrom has plenty of 
precedents and resources to draw upon.  The National Center for State Courts and the 
Federal Judicial Center publish booklets of advice, some of it instantly available on 
the Internet.18  We all have within short term memory the vivid yin and yang 
examples of Judge Lance Ito, of the O.J. Simpson case, and Judge Richard Matsch, 
of the Oklahoma City bombing cases.  (It is generally accepted among trial judges, I 
believe, that the Simpson case set back efforts to bring television cameras into the 
courtroom by a decade, if not a generation.).  
What a trial judge does not have today is an objective or even an accepted test for 
deciding if and when media coverage has unconstitutionally infected a jury pool.  If 
O.J. Simpson had been convicted of murdering his wife, would a habeas petition 
based on prejudicial pretrial publicity have succeeded?  Sheppard v. Maxwell 
provides no answers.  Judge Blythin and the Ohio Supreme Court thought they had a 
litmus test for media-induced prejudice: they found the Sheppard venire untainted 
because fifty-eight of the seventy-two prospective jurors examined, stated that they 
had not prejudged Sheppard’s guilt or innocence.19  Judge Weinman and the United 
States Supreme Court simply blew past that point.  Weinman, quoting  Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Irvin v. Dowd, concluded that “the assurances of the 
jurors must be disregarded for . . . ‘before they entered the jury box, their minds were 
                                                                
15360 U.S. 310 (1959).  
16366 U.S. 717 (1961).  
17381 U.S. 532 (1965).  
18See http://www.fjc.gov (last visited April 10, 2002); http://www.ncsconline.org (last 
visited April 10, 2002); http://www.judges.org (last visited April 10, 2002). 
19Sheppard, 231 F. Supp at 59.  
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saturated by press and radio . . . designed to establish the guilt of the accused.’”20  
The Supreme Court did not even mention the voir dire.21  
Not only do we have no test for determining when a community is infected by 
prejudice, but it is not clear that Justice Clark’s tips and tricks would have any effect 
at all in today’s world of instant messaging, wireless Internet access, no privacy, and 
no recognizable news cycle.  Gag orders on trial participants might help, but the last 
time I looked, the Sixth Circuit had found them to be unconstitutional prior restraints 
on speech.   
The Supreme Court’s thinking in Sheppard v. Maxwell, and the prescriptive 
remedies it offers, proceed I believe from the major premise that judges and the press 
are natural adversaries.  The label—the cliche—most commonly pasted on the kind 
of discussion we are having in Cleveland this weekend is  “free press v. fair trial.”  
That, indeed, was the title of my college thesis, written in 1959 about the Sheppard 
case.  My thinking then, and my conclusion, conformed to the adversarial paradigm: 
I thought American judges could get a leg up on the press by following the British 
model and using the contempt power.  
But more thoughtful (and less naïve) people have begun to question whether the 
adversarial model is a useful one.  Since 1999, a partnership of the First Amendment 
Center of the Freedom Forum in Washington and the Judicial Branch Committee of 
the U.S. courts has been conducting a series of discussions between federal judges 
and journalists about access, information and accountability in news media reporting 
on the federal courts.22  The goal of the program is to encourage and assist in more 
accurate reporting to the public of what happens in federal courts, to help educate 
reporters about the courts’ operations, and to help educate judges about the manner 
in which reporters and newspapers gather and present information about the justice 
system.  Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt  has called for judges to speak out directly 
to the public about issues of importance to them.23  For Judge Reinhardt, those issues 
include judicial appointments, the death penalty, and the subversion of the Fourth 
Amendment that has been a consequence of the war on drugs.  Judge Reinhardt is 
especially critical of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct that permit 
judges to speak to audiences like this one but not to appear in “less erudite fora.”24  
He writes that “Many judges are afraid that, by speaking openly and honestly about 
their concerns and beliefs, they will leave themselves vulnerable to criticism and 
censure; the myth of the judge as the detached, neutral decision maker can only be 
                                                                
20Id. (quoting 366 U.S. 717, 730).  
21Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), probably vindicates Judge Blythin and the 
Ohio Supreme Court.  See Whitebread & Contreras, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the 
Implications for the Criminal Justice System, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1996).  
22See http://www.freedomforum.org (last visited April 10, 2002). 
23Stephen Reinhardt, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 805 
(1995).  
24
“A judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action, 
requiring similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control.  This 
proscription does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge’s official 
duties, to the explanation of court procedures, or to a scholarly presentation made for purposes 
of legal education.”  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3A(6).  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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maintained from afar.”25  Veteran Los Angeles Times reporter Jack Nelson urges  
judges and journalists to establish relations based on trust and respect and then talk 
on background.  Why?  He quotes Griffin Bell—former judge and former Attorney 
General—as saying that the modern judiciary is so powerful that “it’s anti-
democratic not to explain proceedings to the press.”26  
HERMETICALLY SEALED JUSTICE 
Flashback again to poor Judge Blythin.  On the first day of the Sheppard trial, he 
spotted Dorothy Kilgallen in the courtroom.  Most of you will not remember 
Dorothy Kilgallen.  She was a New York print journalist who found her calling in 
the new medium of television.  Judge Blythin, curious about the publicity the trial 
had generated, asked her to visit him in chambers.  Ms. Kilgallen never wrote about 
their meeting at the time of the trial, but ten years later she gave an affidavit to F. 
Lee Bailey, recounting their conversation.  Judge Blythin expressed interest in why 
she had come to Cleveland.  She said it was the trial, which had all the ingredients of 
what the newspaper business calls a good murder: an attractive victim who was 
pregnant, an important member of the community as the accused, and a mystery as to 
who did it.  Judge Blythin responded, “Mystery?  It’s an open and shut case. . . . [H]e 
is guilty as hell.  There’s no question about it.”27  
Judge Weinman, the federal district judge who granted Sheppard’s habeas 
petition, was a perceptive and courageous judge, but on this point he went astray.  He 
found that the Kilgallen story demonstrated Judge Blythin’s bias, that Blythin should 
have disqualified himself, and that his failure to do so violated Sheppard’s 
constitutional rights.  His reasoning was that “a judge must have no interest other 
than the pursuit of justice and when he expresses in emphatic terms the opinion that 
the person before him is guilty, as was done here, the judge then has a personal 
interest in seeing that the defendant is convicted or the judge may well be 
embarrassed for having made such an emphatic statement of guilt.”28  Citing In Re 
Murchison,29 Judge Weinmann invoked the “appearance of justice” standard and 
concluded that, once Judge Blythin made emphatic statements of petitioner’s guilt, it 
could no longer be assumed that he was impartial or that he could exercise “sound 
discretion” — which, even though the jury would decide Sheppard’s guilt, he would 
be required to exercise often during trial. 
Nobody remembers the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Sheppard’s habeas case 
because it was reversed.  On the question of Judge Weinmann’s finding on 
disqualification,30 however, it is worth resurrecting.  The court noted, first, that Ms. 
Kilgallen was never subjected to cross- examination and that the evidence of Judge 
                                                                
25See Reinhardt, supra note 23, at 807-08.  
26Remarks to new federal judges, Federal Judicial Center, Nov. 15, 1995 (on file with the 
author).  
27Sheppard, 231 F. Supp. at 64.  
28Id. at 65.  
29349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  Note the transgressions of both Judge Blythin and the 
Cleveland Press came before Murchison.  
30Sheppard, 346 F.2d at 725-30.  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/4
2001] A DISTANT MIRROR:  THE SHEPPARD CASE 397 
 
Blythin’s statement was far from uncontroverted.  It pointed out numerous instances 
of Judge Blythin’s in-court conduct that indicated impartiality.  But even if Judge 
Blythin did say he thought Sheppard was guilty, the court said, a judge is not 
disqualified to sit in a criminal case merely because he has an opinion as to the guilt 
of the accused or is convinced of his guilt.  The Murchison case on which Weinmann 
had relied was much different, the Sixth Circuit said.  That was a due process case in 
which a judge, acting under Michigan law, first sat as a one-man grand jury under 
Michigan law and cited a witness for contempt, and then put his robe back on to 
preside over the contempt hearing.  The Sixth Circuit said, “it would come as no 
surprise to the legal profession and to an informed judiciary that there must be many 
times when a presiding judge exhibits impeccable fairness and discretion in his 
conduct of a criminal jury trial notwithstanding his own belief in the guilt of a 
defendant.”   
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s thinking, however, and at variance with what I 
have characterized as more thoughtful views about the relationship between courts 
and the press, it has become part of the weaponry of modern litigation (not to 
mention politics) to accuse judges of bias, or to suggest the “appearance of 
impropriety” in some judicial statement.31  The D.C. Circuit reversed a decision of a 
colleague of mine in a case involving Microsoft Corporation and ordered it assigned 
to a different judge on remand (at the joint motion of both sides to the litigation), 
noting that, to do so, it was not necessary to find “actual bias or prejudice, but only 
that the facts ‘might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] 
impartiality.’”32  Another colleague became the second judicial target of Microsoft 
Corporation, which wanted him removed for giving interviews about the case to 
carefully selected, trusted reporters that were embargoed until his decision had been 
issued.  The judge’s motive?  To explain proceedings to the press.  Was there 
evidence of bias or the “appearance of impropriety?”  Those questions are before the 
Court of Appeals, and of course I may not comment on them.33  Two non-case 
                                                                
31See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Boston’s Children First, 
244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1995); Judith R. v. Hey, 
405 S.E.2d 447 (West Virginia 1990); Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 444 A.2d 
196 (Connecticut 1982).  See generally Cynthia Gray, Disqualification Based on Comments to 
the Media in a Pending Case, 23 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y JUD. CONDUCT REP. No. 2, (Summer 
2001).    
32United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)).    
33On June 28, 2001, after these remarks were presented, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a righteously indignant opinion, found on the basis of 
a record no more cross-examined than that of Judge Blythin’s chat with Dorothy Kilgallen that 
my colleague had violated Canons 3A(6), 2, and 3A(4), not to mention 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  
The court found no actual bias but easily recognized the “appearance of impropriety” genie 
when it was called forth (by Microsoft) and directed that, upon remand, the case be assigned to 
another judge.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107 et seq.  I am not yet free to 
comment, since Microsoft, unsatisfied with its success in ousting a second federal judge, has 
petitioned for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there was no actual 
bias.  But see Evan P. Schultz, Behind the Bench: Is the problem with Judge Jackson that he 
appeared to be biased?  Or that he appeared to be human?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at 50; 
Paul Rosenzweig, The Press and the Judge: Abusing the Canons, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2001, 
at 50.  See Josh Gerstein, Speaking to the Public, LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2001, at 51 (“The 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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related comments appear to be germane, however.  One, quoting Judge Jerome 
Frank, is this:   “Impartiality is not gullibility.  Disinterestedness does not mean 
child-like innocence.  If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those 
court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.”34  The other is 
that “appearance of impropriety” is a dangerous genie; it can be released from its 
lamp by anyone who calls its name.   
The judiciary is ill-served, in my view, by what Judge Reinhardt calls the “myth 
of the judge as the detached, neutral decision maker.”35  Continuing public 
confidence in the courts depends upon our making ourselves and our decisions 
accessible and understandable to the people.  Citizens want judicial decisions to be 
rendered by fellow citizens—not by Druids. 
In the same way, I think, we ill serve the interests of justice by insisting on pure, 
certifiably ignorant juries in pursuit of what Jeffrey Abramson has called the 
“impartial justice ideal.”36  Ignorance is not impartiality, as Abramson reminds us by 
quoting from something Mark Twain wrote almost 130 years ago: “A noted 
desperado killed Mr. B, a good citizen, in the most wanton and cold-blooded 
way. . . . [T]he papers were full of it, and all men capable of reading read about it.  
And of course all men not deaf and dumb and idiotic talked about it.”37  When a jury 
was selected to try the case, “the system rigidly exclude[d] honest men and men of 
brains. . . . A minister, intelligent, esteemed, and greatly respected; a merchant of 
high character and known probity; a quartz-mill owner of excellent standing, were all 
questioned in the same way, and all set aside.  Each said the public talk and the 
newspaper reports had not so biased his mind but that sworn testimony would . . . 
enable him to render a verdict without prejudice and in accordance with the facts.  
But of course such men could not be trusted with the case.”38  
The presumption of bias the Supreme Court found in Rideau v. Louisiana,39 the 
probability of prejudice standard in Estes v. Texas,40 and the essentially standardless 
“we-know-it-when-we-see-it” approach to pretrial publicity in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
all combine, as Abramson says,  to show “how tarnished [is] the once proud 
reputation of the jury of the vicinage as an informed and deliberative body.”41 
                                                          
problem with most judges is not that they talk to the press too much, but too little.  The vitriol 
the court directed at Jackson . . . may make judges even warier about talking to reporters.  The 
result of that will be less-informed and less-accurate reports about judicial actions, and, 
ultimately, a more poorly informed public.”).    
34Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549 (1994).    
35See Reinhardt, supra note 23, at 807.  
36JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 
(1994).  
37Id. at 45 (citing MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT (1877)). 
38Id. 
39373 U.S. 723 (1963).  
40381 U.S. 532 (1965).  
41See ABRAMSON, supra note 36, at 48.  Sheppard may actually represent the high water 
mark of that tarnish (catch that metaphor), in view of the new standard for voir dire announced 
in Mu’Min v. Virginia.  See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 21, at 1601.    
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/4
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DNA EVIDENCE AND THE “RELIABLE VERDICT” 
Justice is not a scientific, perfectable, impersonal, machine process.  Anyone 
seeking evidence of that proposition would do well to visit the District of Columbia, 
where acquittals and hung juries in gun possession cases are so frequent as to seem 
normal.  Why the conviction rate is so low (approaching one-third) we will never 
know.  What we can infer from anecdotal experience, however, is that some 
significant part of the community (a) is tired of sending young African American 
men to jail, (b) believes that having a gun may be necessary for self defense, (c) is 
prepared to find reasonable doubt in if there is any suggestion that “somebody 
planted the gun,” or (d) all of the above. 
Those who expect the recent development of  DNA identification technology to 
usher in an era of more “reliable” jury verdicts would do well to contemplate our 
experience with fingerprints in the twilight of that technology.  The scientific basis 
and reliability of fingerprint evidence to prove guilt are now in serious doubt.42  But 
the “myth of fingerprints” has been hardwired into the community’s consciousness to 
the point where the absence of fingerprint evidence can be, and often is, fatal to a 
gun possession case.  An hour or more of the routine gun possession trial is now 
consumed by expert testimony, adduced by the prosecution, to explain how latent 
fingerprints are left, how they are lifted, how they are analyzed—and why none were 
found on this particular weapon.   
DNA evidence has clearly arrived.43  Its power to right wrongs and redress 
injustice is manifest,44 and the technology can be expected to have a long run.  The 
law of unintended consequences is alive and well in the world, however.  If the 
community becomes as familiar with DNA evidence as it (thinks it) is with 
fingerprint evidence and juries begin to find reasonable doubt because of its absence, 
we may all have cause to wonder where the “reliable jury verdict” went.   
                                                                
42At this conference, and in his article Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s 
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998), 
Professor Michael J. Saks presented stunning arguments for the proposition that fingerprint 
evidence is unreliable and, if challenged under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), of questionable admissibility.   
43A few days before the Conference, Judge Albert Bryan ruled that a prisoner bringing a 
post-conviction challenge has a due process right to DNA testing because the result could 
constitute material exculpatory evidence.  Harvey v. Horan, 2001 WL 419142 (E.D. Va. Apr. 
16, 2001), rev’d 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002). 
44See http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited May 15, 2002).  
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